client: Remove hostname verification check

2021-03-04 14:36:31 -05:00 · 2021-03-04 14:36:31 -05:00 · bfa3356d3a
commit bfa3356d3a
parent 9f3564936e
2 changed files with 0 additions and 216 deletions
--- a/client.go
+++ b/client.go
@ -175,10 +175,6 @@ func (c *Client) dialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Con
 func (c *Client) verifyConnection(cs tls.ConnectionState, hostname string) error {
 	cert := cs.PeerCertificates[0]
 	// Verify hostname
 	if err := verifyHostname(cert, hostname); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	// See if the client trusts the certificate
 	if c.TrustCertificate != nil {
 		return c.TrustCertificate(hostname, cert)
--- a/verify_hostname.go
+++ b/verify_hostname.go
@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
 // Hostname verification code from the crypto/x509 package.
 // Modified to allow Common Names in the short term, until new certificates
 // can be issued with SANs.
 // Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 package gemini
 import (
 	"crypto/x509"
 	"net"
 	"strings"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 )
 var oidExtensionSubjectAltName = []int{2, 5, 29, 17}
 func hasSANExtension(c *x509.Certificate) bool {
 	for _, e := range c.Extensions {
 		if e.Id.Equal(oidExtensionSubjectAltName) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}
 	return false
 }
 func validHostnamePattern(host string) bool { return validHostname(host, true) }
 func validHostnameInput(host string) bool   { return validHostname(host, false) }
 // validHostname reports whether host is a valid hostname that can be matched or
 // matched against according to RFC 6125 2.2, with some leniency to accommodate
 // legacy values.
 func validHostname(host string, isPattern bool) bool {
 	if !isPattern {
 		host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".")
 	}
 	if len(host) == 0 {
 		return false
 	}
 	for i, part := range strings.Split(host, ".") {
 		if part == "" {
 			// Empty label.
 			return false
 		}
 		if isPattern && i == 0 && part == "*" {
 			// Only allow full left-most wildcards, as those are the only ones
 			// we match, and matching literal '*' characters is probably never
 			// the expected behavior.
 			continue
 		}
 		for j, c := range part {
 			if 'a' <= c && c <= 'z' {
 				continue
 			}
 			if '0' <= c && c <= '9' {
 				continue
 			}
 			if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
 				continue
 			}
 			if c == '-' && j != 0 {
 				continue
 			}
 			if c == '_' {
 				// Not a valid character in hostnames, but commonly
 				// found in deployments outside the WebPKI.
 				continue
 			}
 			return false
 		}
 	}
 	return true
 }
 // commonNameAsHostname reports whether the Common Name field should be
 // considered the hostname that the certificate is valid for. This is a legacy
 // behavior, disabled by default or if the Subject Alt Name extension is present.
 //
 // It applies the strict validHostname check to the Common Name field, so that
 // certificates without SANs can still be validated against CAs with name
 // constraints if there is no risk the CN would be matched as a hostname.
 // See NameConstraintsWithoutSANs and issue 24151.
 func commonNameAsHostname(c *x509.Certificate) bool {
 	return !hasSANExtension(c) && validHostnamePattern(c.Subject.CommonName)
 }
 func matchExactly(hostA, hostB string) bool {
 	if hostA == "" || hostA == "." || hostB == "" || hostB == "." {
 		return false
 	}
 	return toLowerCaseASCII(hostA) == toLowerCaseASCII(hostB)
 }
 func matchHostnames(pattern, host string) bool {
 	pattern = toLowerCaseASCII(pattern)
 	host = toLowerCaseASCII(strings.TrimSuffix(host, "."))
 	if len(pattern) == 0 || len(host) == 0 {
 		return false
 	}
 	patternParts := strings.Split(pattern, ".")
 	hostParts := strings.Split(host, ".")
 	if len(patternParts) != len(hostParts) {
 		return false
 	}
 	for i, patternPart := range patternParts {
 		if i == 0 && patternPart == "*" {
 			continue
 		}
 		if patternPart != hostParts[i] {
 			return false
 		}
 	}
 	return true
 }
 // toLowerCaseASCII returns a lower-case version of in. See RFC 6125 6.4.1. We use
 // an explicitly ASCII function to avoid any sharp corners resulting from
 // performing Unicode operations on DNS labels.
 func toLowerCaseASCII(in string) string {
 	// If the string is already lower-case then there's nothing to do.
 	isAlreadyLowerCase := true
 	for _, c := range in {
 		if c == utf8.RuneError {
 			// If we get a UTF-8 error then there might be
 			// upper-case ASCII bytes in the invalid sequence.
 			isAlreadyLowerCase = false
 			break
 		}
 		if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
 			isAlreadyLowerCase = false
 			break
 		}
 	}
 	if isAlreadyLowerCase {
 		return in
 	}
 	out := []byte(in)
 	for i, c := range out {
 		if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
 			out[i] += 'a' - 'A'
 		}
 	}
 	return string(out)
 }
 // verifyHostname returns nil if c is a valid certificate for the named host.
 // Otherwise it returns an error describing the mismatch.
 //
 // IP addresses can be optionally enclosed in square brackets and are checked
 // against the IPAddresses field. Other names are checked case insensitively
 // against the DNSNames field. If the names are valid hostnames, the certificate
 // fields can have a wildcard as the left-most label.
 //
 // The legacy Common Name field is ignored unless it's a valid hostname, the
 // certificate doesn't have any Subject Alternative Names, and the GODEBUG
 // environment variable is set to "x509ignoreCN=0". Support for Common Name is
 // deprecated will be entirely removed in the future.
 func verifyHostname(c *x509.Certificate, h string) error {
 	// IP addresses may be written in [ ].
 	candidateIP := h
 	if len(h) >= 3 && h[0] == '[' && h[len(h)-1] == ']' {
 		candidateIP = h[1 : len(h)-1]
 	}
 	if ip := net.ParseIP(candidateIP); ip != nil {
 		// We only match IP addresses against IP SANs.
 		// See RFC 6125, Appendix B.2.
 		for _, candidate := range c.IPAddresses {
 			if ip.Equal(candidate) {
 				return nil
 			}
 		}
 		return x509.HostnameError{c, candidateIP}
 	}
 	names := c.DNSNames
 	if commonNameAsHostname(c) {
 		names = []string{c.Subject.CommonName}
 	}
 	candidateName := toLowerCaseASCII(h) // Save allocations inside the loop.
 	validCandidateName := validHostnameInput(candidateName)
 	for _, match := range names {
 		// Ideally, we'd only match valid hostnames according to RFC 6125 like
 		// browsers (more or less) do, but in practice Go is used in a wider
 		// array of contexts and can't even assume DNS resolution. Instead,
 		// always allow perfect matches, and only apply wildcard and trailing
 		// dot processing to valid hostnames.
 		if validCandidateName && validHostnamePattern(match) {
 			if matchHostnames(match, candidateName) {
 				return nil
 			}
 		} else {
 			if matchExactly(match, candidateName) {
 				return nil
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	return x509.HostnameError{c, h}
 }